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STRUCTURING BETTER CAPS FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
COURTNEY MORAN AND CASEY BALL* 
ABSTRACT 
Policymakers who are eager to promote the development and adoption of 
environmentally sustainable technologies too often ignore certain im-
portant regulatory principles when crafting incentive programs. Some ap-
proaches to limiting and winding down sustainability incentive programs 
have proven to be inefficient and unjust. Too often, the winding down pro-
cess only begins when lawmakers face unpredicted budgetary constraints. 
This article argues that state and federal lawmakers could better promote 
economic efficiency and equity in sustainability-oriented policy design by 
more consistently adhering to the principles of gradualism, adequate no-
tice, and respect for investment-backed expectations. Using examples of 
deficiencies in certain net metering program caps, tax credit program sun-
sets, and High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane access rules for electric cars, 
this article illustrates the importance of these core regulatory principles 
and advocates for a greater focus on them in the structuring of limits on 
sustainability incentive policies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Todd and Sylvia Alfortish purchased a rooftop solar energy system in 
Louisiana, expecting to receive tax credits from the state to reduce the system’s 
overall price.1 To cover the up-front costs of installation until they received their tax 
credit, Todd and Sylvia obtained an eighteen-month “interest free” bridge loan.2 As 
part of the sales pitch to Todd and Sylvia, the company that sold the solar panels to 
the couple allegedly guaranteed they would receive the state income tax credits.3 
Unfortunately, the legislature abruptly placed a cap on the tax credits that limited 
the credit’s availability far below the expected demand.4 
When Todd and Sylvia ultimately applied for the tax credit, their application 
was denied because the state’s new cap on the program had already been met.5 
Then the couple learned that their “interest free” bridge loan was actually an “in-
terest waivable” loan, and that the interest was waivable only if they received the 
income tax credit.6 Soon, Todd and Sylvia faced large payments on their bridge loan, 
with no hope of receiving help from the tax credit program.7 
                                                                
 1. Class Action Complaint at 2, Alfortish v. GreenSky, LLC, No. CV 16-15084 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 
2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Lawmakers Curtail Louisiana’s Generous Solar Tax Break, KATC.COM (June 23, 2015), 
http://www.katc.com/story/29391294/lawmakers-curtail-louisianas-generous-solar-tax-break [hereinaf-
ter Lawmakers]. 
 5. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 7. 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. Id. 
 
2018 STRUCTURING BETTER CAPS FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
179 
 
Louisiana’s swift suspension of its solar energy tax credit program caught hun-
dreds of Louisiana households off guard. Many of these families are now part of a 
class action lawsuit against solar installation and financing companies, claiming, 
among other things, that the companies misled them about the large tax credits 
when selling them solar panels.8 However, the Louisiana state legislature is argua-
bly at least partially to blame for so quickly ending the state’s solar energy tax 
credit.9 
Policymakers who are eager to promote the development and adoption of en-
vironmentally sustainable technologies too often ignore some important regulatory 
principles. Programs without effective caps or sunset provisions can quickly turn 
from being a boon to the renewables industry into a hindrance. A poorly-crafted 
incentive program quickly runs up against budgetary and political concerns, and 
tends to evoke drastic measures to curtail the program.10 This article focuses on the 
need for careful planning at the front-end of incentive programs and advocates for 
adherence to basic regulatory principles that policymakers often overlook in their 
zeal to provide subsidies for renewable energy projects. 
Part I of this article highlights three essential and often-overlooked principles 
associated with the formation of effective government-funded incentive programs: 
gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and providing adequate 
notice of program changes. Part II focuses on two specific examples of incentive 
programs for sustainability-oriented investment—net metering and tax credits—
and explains how inadequate adherence to the principles listed above unjustifiably 
constrained their effectiveness. Part II also examines some recent smaller incentive 
programs facing similar challenges. Finally, Part II proposes some specific ways that 
policymakers can avoid repeating these mistakes when designing future sustaina-
bility policy incentives. 
A. Environmental Subsidies and Important Regulatory Principles 
Over the past decade, subsidies and incentive programs helped unleash un-
precedented growth in renewable energy and other sustainability-oriented devel-
opment.11 Subsidies increase demand for a product, which leads to more research 
                                                                
 8. See Michael Abella, Kenner Couple Alleges GreenSky, SunTrust Misrepresented Loans, 
LOUISIANA RECORD (Nov. 8, 2016), http://louisianarecord.com/stories/511018723-kenner-couple-alleges-
greensky-suntrust-misrepresented-loans.  
 9. Not surprisingly, solar system owners have also formed a class action, suing the Louisiana 
Department of Revenue, claiming they are entitled to tax credits that were supposed to be guaranteed. See 
Solar Panel Customers Sue State Over Tax Credits, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2016/09/solar_panel_customers_sue_stat.html. 
 10. See infra Part II.  
 11. Matt Weiser, Here Comes the Sun: US Solar Power Market Hits All-Time High, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/jun/28/solar-power-energy-us-
utilities-environment-climate-change. 
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and development, ultimately lowering the cost to produce the product.12 If subsi-
dies are implemented correctly, market forces should allow a new technology to 
slowly wean off the subsidy and become competitive against established technol-
ogy. 
In the mid-2000s, U.S. lawmakers enacted several bipartisan programs to in-
centivize a gradual transition to renewable energies.13 Congress enacted the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 because 
of high oil prices and serious concerns that the U.S. was too dependent on foreign 
supplies.14 Global climate change concerns also spurred efforts to move the U.S. 
from its dependence on cheap fossil fuels to more environmentally friendly sources 
of energy. These efforts included federal tax credits for wind and solar, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s crackdown on coal-fired power plants,15 and the U.S. 
commitment to the Paris Agreement.16 
Unfortunately, some poorly-designed sustainability incentive policies recently 
generated political backlash, angered citizens, spurred unnecessary litigation, and 
created severe budgetary problems for the governments enacting them.17 In many 
cases, governments brought these problems upon themselves by ignoring three 
basic principles: gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and 
providing adequate notice before materially changing incentive policies. 
Why, then, have many policymakers overlooked them in recent years in their 
crafting of sustainability-oriented incentive programs? Also, how can governments 
better avoid making similar mistakes in the future? This section describes the role 
that incentive programs played in promoting environmentally sustainable develop-
ment over the past decade, explains the importance of the three aforementioned 
principles in the crafting of these policies, and highlights some specific examples of 
instances when governments have ignored these principles to their peril. 
i. Basic Overview of Subsidies and Incentive Programs for Environmental 
Sustainability 
Many recent renewable energy subsidies were created, at least in part, to curb 
the effects of climate change. Climate change is a growing and daunting concern 
that calls for not only a local response, but also a global response.18 The leading 
                                                                
 12. Camilo Patrignani, The Solar Industry Needs to Let Its Federal Tax Credit Die, Says This CEO, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-solar-industry-
needs-to-let-its-federal-tax-credit-die-says-this-ceo#gs.Gmb3lg8. 
 13. Guri Bang, Energy Security and Climate Change Concerns: Triggers for Energy Policy Change 
in the United States?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1645, 1649 (2010). 
 14. Id. at 1651–52. 
 15. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Gen-
erating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,667 (Dec. 22, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 16. William Yardley & Vera Haller, At U.N., 175 Nations Sign Landmark Accord on Global Warm-
ing. ‘We Are in a Race Against Time, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-sej-
climate-change-20160422-story.html. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. “Climate change refers to any significant change in the measures of climate lasting for an 
extended period of time . . . climate change includes major changes in temperature, precipitation, or wind 
patterns, among others, that occur over several decades or longer.” Glossary of Climate Change Terms, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/glossary.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2016). 
 
2018 STRUCTURING BETTER CAPS FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
181 
 
cause of climate change is greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, 
produced by the consumption of fossil fuels. 19  If climate change remains un-
checked, it can reduce crop production, affect human health, and contribute to a 
rise in sea levels.20 
Renewable energy sources emit fewer greenhouse gases than fossil fuels.21 
Over the last decade, renewable energy production in the United States grew stead-
ily, with significant increases in the solar and wind industries.22 Hybrid and electric 
vehicles continue to grow in popularity—enough that states are developing new 
taxes to replace the antiquated gasoline tax.23 What is driving this investment in 
clean, renewable energy sources? In a word, subsidies. 
Subsidies are broadly defined as government-provided benefits to businesses 
or individuals who satisfy certain specified requirements.24 Development subsidies 
are generally justified as means of helping recipients capture more societal benefits 
from their development activities.25 These captured social benefits are also com-
monly referred to as positive externalities. Subsidies take many forms, including tax 
credits, grants, in-kind subsidies, and cross-subsidies.26 Subsidies in the renewable 
energy industry encourage consumers and businesses to invest in sustainable en-
ergy projects that might otherwise be more expensive than non-renewable sources 
of energy.27 For example, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, citizens and busi-
nesses that invested in nonresidential or residential solar energy installations were 
eligible for federal tax credits ranging from to 10–30% of the project cost.28 
                                                                
 19. Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural Resource 
Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 66 (2011); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (Cambridge University Press 2014), 
http://ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf. 
 20. Klass, supra note 19.  
 21. Jaron L. Hudgins, Alternative Energy in the U.S. Energy Supply: Current Trends and Recom-
mendations for the Future, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 383, 384–85 (2013).  
 22. Adam Wilson, The Future Looks Bright, or Does It? An Analysis of Solar Energy Law and Policy 
in the United States, 22 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 333, 335 (2016) (“Solar electricity production has seen 
stunning growth rates in the past five years: 2011 saw a 67%increase in generation over 2010, 2012 saw a 
42% increase, 2013 saw a 47% increase, and 2014 saw a 104% increase.”). See also Dep’t of Energy, 20% 
Wind Energy by 2030: Increasing Wind Energy’s Contribution to U.S. Electricity Supply, ENERGY.GOV, 
https://energy.gov/eere/wind/20-wind-energy-2030-increasing-wind-energys-contribution-us-electricity-
supply (last visited Nov. 27, 2017) (Additionally, wind energy is expected to supply 20% of the United States’ 
electricity in 2030 and 35% in 2050.). 
 23. See, e.g., Courtney Moran & Casey Ball, Penny Lane, Literally: Funding Roads One Vehicle 
Mile at a Time, 5 WILLAMETTE ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2016). 
 24. RONALD STEENBLIK, A SUBSIDY PRIMER 8 (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., n.d.) 
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/primer.pdf. 
 25. Return-on-Investment for Select State Economic Development Incentive Programs, Off. of 
Econ. & Demographic Res. 6 (Jan. 1, 2014), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/returnoninvest-
ment/EDR_ROI.pdf.  
 26. STEENBLIK, supra note 24, at 18. 
 27. Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings: A Comparative 
Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 419–20 (2005). 
 28. Kyle Weismantle, Building a Better Solar Energy Framework, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 221, 232 
(2014) (The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 has extended this federal tax credit through to 
2016.). 
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Incentive programs should not be permanent fixtures in the energy industry. 
By their very nature, subsidies should taper as new technologies develop a foothold 
in the market.29 Thus, when lawmakers develop a subsidy, they must consider the 
endgame. A subsidy without a cap or sunset provision may prove disastrous for a 
government’s budget, as evidenced by Louisiana’s Solar Energy Tax Credit.30 The 
next sections discuss three regulatory principles that, if applied at the formation of 
a subsidy, will lead to greater success. 
ii. The Principle of Gradualism 
A well-designed incentive program requires the predictability that comes from 
gradual changes to the benefits it provides. While the term “gradualism” encom-
passes many definitions across a variety of fields,31 for purposes of this article, 
“gradualism” represents the principle that, when possible, policy changes “should 
be implemented without creating dramatic shifts in cost and benefits to individuals 
or groups.”32 All else equal, lawmakers should seek to implement new policies and 
end existing policies in ways that provide sufficient time for citizens and businesses 
to efficiently adapt.33 Because the renewable energy industry is subject to complex 
market dynamics, 34 lawmakers must first understand how policy influences the 
market, and then monitor the market to allow for a gradual response to policy 
changes.35 
The virtues of gradualism have been understood for centuries. Even Aesop’s 
ancient fable of The Tortoise and the Hare highlights the value of gradualism in ways 
that would benefit modern incentive programs. In the fable, a tortoise and a hare 
agree to a race. The hare, excited and confident that he can win, starts the race at 
a sprint, while the tortoise moves at a slower, but consistent pace. Ultimately, the 
hare becomes over-confident and stops running before reaching the finish line. In 
                                                                
 29. R. Haas et al., How to Promote Renewable Energy Systems Successfully and Effectively, 32 
ENERGY POL’Y 833, 838 (2004) (“In later market stages, [subsidies] should be reduced. At the same time ex-
cessive (windfall) profits should be avoided.”). 
 30. See infra Part II.B.i. 
 31. Other names for gradualism include incrementalism, rate shock, and rate stability.  
 32. Memorandum from Roger Gray et al. to Comm’rs Simpson, Brown, Helgeson, Manning & 
Mital 6 (Feb. 25, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20140717042712/http://www.eweb.org/public/com-
missioners/meetings/2013/130305/M8_BackgrounderWhitepaperonEWEBRateMakingPrinciples.pdf. 
 33. See N.Y. DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. COMM’N, STAFF WHITE PAPER ON RATEMAKING AND UTILITY BUSINESS 
MODELS 79 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y. STAFF WHITE PAPER], https://www.energymarket-
ers.com/Documents/NY_REV_Track_2_paper.pdf; William Opalka & Rich Heidorn, Jr., NYPSC Outlines Re-
forming the Energy Vision Changes, RTO INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.rtoinsider.com/nypsc-reform-
ing-the-energy-vision-16910/. 
 34. See generally Scott Victor Valentine, Wind Power Policy in Complex Adaptive Markets, 19 
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1 (2013). 
 35. Scott Victor Valentine, Gradualist Best Practice in Wind Power Policy, 22 ENERGY FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 74, 75 (2014). But see Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Ali Al-Jabir, Application of the Nar-
ragansett Electric Company d/b/a National Grid for Approval of a Change in Electric and Gas Distribution 
Rates Pursuant to R.I.G.L. Sections 39-3-10 and 39-1-3-11, No. 4323, at 5 (Aug. 30, 2012) 
http://www.ripuc.org/eventsactions/docket/4323-Navy-AlJabir(8-30-12).pdf (“Although factors such as . . . 
, gradualism, . . . can also be taken into consideration when determining the final spread of the revenue 
requirement among classes, the fundamental starting point and guideline should be the cost of serving each 
customer class . . . “). 
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contrast, the tortoise slowly trudges along and eventually overtakes the hare to win 
the race. The familiar moral of this fable is that “slow and steady wins the race.” In 
the context of designing policy incentives, Sir Rodger L’Estrange’s moral, published 
in 1692, is an even better fit: “A [p]lodding [d]iligence brings us sooner to our [j]our-
ney’s [e]nd then a [f]luttering [w]ay of [a]dvancing by [s]tarts and by [s]tops; for ‘tis 
[p]erseverance alone that can carry us [all the way].”36 
Lawmakers often approach efforts to incentivize renewable energy technol-
ogy like Aesop’s infamous hare. In many cases, the subsidies and incentive pro-
grams they design are generous in the first few years but then abruptly end and 
destroy much of the momentum they generate. This “fluttering way of advancing” 
unnecessarily dampens the effectiveness of policies aimed at promoting environ-
mental sustainability and renewable energy technologies.37 “Boom and bust” gov-
ernment policies, as some critics have labeled them, create regulatory uncertainty 
and reduce investor confidence.38 Intermittent and haphazard energy policies also 
have a chilling effect on the market for new and improved products.39 
The principle of gradualism is often cited in rate cases before public utility 
commissions (PUCs).40 In the context of rate design, gradualism refers to “phasing 
in rates . . . over a longer period of time allowing consumers to gradually make the 
adjustments in the ‘elastic’ part of their spending so as to pay for increased . . . 
costs. . . .”41 While on occasion PUCs have modified or rejected rate changes based 
on concerns over abrupt changes affecting consumers,42 some states do not even 
                                                                
 36. Sir Rodger L’Estrange, Fables, of Æsop and other Eminent Mythologists: with Morals and Re-
flexions, A Hare and a Tortoise 123–24 (London, R. Sare et al. 1692). 
 37. Id. 
 38. N.Y. STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 33, at 89 n.90 (quoting Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. 
Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 103, 117 (2013)). 
 39. JESSE JENKINS ET AL., BEYOND BOOM AND BUST: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON A PATH TO SUBSIDY 
INDEPENDENCE 37 (Brookings Inst., 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/0418_clean_investments_final-paper_PDF.pdf.  
 40. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis Dep’t of Pub. Utilities, 39066, 1991 WL 531202, at *72 ( Nov. 1, 
1991)(“[U]tility rates should be designed to the maximum extent practicable to reflect the cost of providing 
service, while avoiding abrupt changes in rate structures and undue hardship.”); Commissions Investigation 
of Value & Cost of Distributed Generation, 334 P.U.R.4th 29, at 125 (Jan 3, 2017) (Adopting two new solar 
valuation methodologies to replace net metering that will “provide a path for a gradual transition away 
from the current net metering model to one that better reflects the value of [distributed generation].”); 
Nev. Power Co., 15-07041 & 15-07042, 2016 WL 693150, at *68 ¶ 273 (Feb. 12, 2016) (“Gradualism is the 
concept used by utility regulatory commissions to manage change associated with moving utility prices to 
reflect new or changing rate structures of costs of service.”). 
 41. Lloyd v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 A.2d 1010, 1018 n.14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). 
 42. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Power, 279 P.U.R.4th 1 (Feb. 18, 2010) (approving rate increase, 
but staggering its implementation to conform with gradualism); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 213 P.U.R.4th 376, 
at 5 (Nov. 20, 2001) (“When allocating a utility’s revenue requirement among customer classes, the Com-
mission has pursued—where possible—a policy of gradualism by avoiding substantial rate increases for any 
particular customer class.”). 
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require their PUCs to consider gradualism.43 In addition to rate change cases, refer-
ences to gradualism also appear in international trade agreements,44 the Federal 
Reserve interest rate policies,45 and case law.46 
Of course, the principle of gradualism does not exist in a vacuum. Lawmakers 
often face multiple goals when setting caps for tax credits or other incentive pro-
grams. Protecting consumers from dramatic shifts in costs is only one of those 
goals.47 A few utility rate cases have even emphasized the potential danger of fo-
cusing only on gradualism at the expense of other important considerations. 48 
Moreover, governing statutes for PUCs rarely require the commissions to specifi-
cally consider gradualism when setting rates and crafting policies.49 
Nonetheless, policymakers in environmental sustainability have too often ig-
nored gradualism to their peril. Two contrasting examples help to illustrate this 
point. A first example is an electric utility rate case in Iowa in 2015.50 The Iowa Util-
ities Board encouraged electric utilities to develop pilot programs to “expand re-
newable [distributed generation] in Iowa.”51 Two utilities, MidAmerican Energy and 
                                                                
 43. See, e.g., Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n. of Ohio, 926 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 
2010). 
 44. Richard Chisik, Gradualism in Free Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Justification, 59 J. INT’L 
ECON. 367, 367 (2003); see also Richard M. Bird, A View From the North, 49 TAX L. REV. 745, 756 (1994) 
(“When dealing with complex, uncertain and changing problems, both practice and theory suggest an in-
cremental ‘problem-solving’ approach – ‘muddling through’ as it sometimes has been disrespectfully called 
– is not only all that can be done, it is generally the best fallible humans can do.”); see Barbara A. Cherry, 
Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Under Complexity: Providing Resilience Within the Rule of 
Law, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 30 n. 191 (2008). 
 45. Jeremy C. Stein & Adi Sunderam, Gradualism in Monetary Policy: A Time-Consistency Prob-
lem?, 1 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21569, 2015); Ben S. Bernanke, Member, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at an Economics Luncheon Co-Sponsored by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of San Francisco & the Univ. of Wash. (May 20, 2004) (“As a general rule, the Federal Reserve 
tends to adjust interest rates incrementally, in a series of small or moderate steps in the same direction.”).  
 46. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in A Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and 
the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1122 (1988) (“The traditional judicial dis-
course, with its penchant for precedent, reasoning by analogy, and reliance upon the past, is essentially a 
conservative one. . . . The most successful arguments, therefore, . . . advocate the kind of gradualism that 
common law judges understand best. Such arguments result in incremental, rather than radical, change and 
adapt easily to the preexisting regulatory scheme.”). 
 47. Perhaps the most prominent factor facing lawmakers is the budget. When Louisiana lowered 
its cap on solar tax credits, the motivating factor was a budget deficit and inflated subsidy payments. Other 
factors include guaranteeing a rate of return to utilities, competing economic interests, and of course, po-
litical agendas. See infra Part II.B.i. 
 48. Ohio Consumers’ Counsel, 926 N.E.2d at 266 (finding “no authority that gradualism is a factor 
that the [public utilities] commission is required to apply in every rate-design case.”); Watergate E., Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of D.C., 665 A.2d 943, 950 (D.C. 1995) (“We also observe . . . that in addition to its policy 
of gradualism, the Commission was also required to consider the very large revenue deficit . . .”); Lloyd v. 
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 904 A.2d 1010, 1020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (“[W]hile permitted, gradual-
ism is but one of many factors to be considered and weighed by the Commission in determining rate de-
signs, and principles of gradualism cannot be allowed to trump all other valid ratemaking concerns . . . .”). 
 49. New Hampshire, for example, only requires that the commission consider whether the rates 
are “unreasonable.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378:7 (West 2017). Nevada comes the closest by requiring the 
commission to “[p]rovide for stability in rates and for the availability and reliability of electric service,” as 
one of five factors. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703.151 (2009);  
 50. Distributed Generation, NOI-2014-001, 2015 WL 6758412, (Oct. 30, 2015), 
https://efs.iowa.gov/cs/groups/external/documents/docket/mdax/mtqx/~edisp/1141884.pdf. 
 51. Id. at *5. 
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Alliant Energy, responded to this call by proposing steep new fees for customers 
who participated in their pilot programs.52 These proposed fees drew the attention 
of solar advocates, who warned that the proposed fees would stifle the solar indus-
try in Iowa.53 The utilities argued that solar customers do not pay a fair share for 
“grid-related services” and that this difference should be recovered through a de-
mand charge.54 However, at the end of 2015, MidAmerican had less than 300 solar 
customers out of a total of 667,000 customer accounts, so any impact on other cus-
tomers was extremely small.55 The utilities acknowledged that solar energy-using 
customers were a small percentage of the total customers, but nonetheless claimed 
that it was best to address these cost shift issues early before they became more 
significant.56 
The Iowa utilities’ proposed fees on solar energy users undesirably violated 
the principle of gradualism in at least two ways. First, it was apparent that the pro-
posed solar fees were exorbitant in size and would undoubtedly induce a rate shock 
that would prevent more consumers from installing solar.57 Second, the utilities’ 
proposal came at a time when the solar industry in the State was still in its infancy.58 
Rather than allowing solar to grow in a moderated, partially subsidized environ-
ment, the utilities proposed fees would eliminate any cost-saving incentives for 
homeowners to install solar, and effectively stop the installation of rooftop solar 
systems within the state.59 Ultimately, the Iowa Utilities Board elected to keep net 
metering, but modified the program to prevent solar customers from rolling over 
excess credits from year to year.60 
In contrast, New York’s response to the growth of distributed renewable en-
ergy is an example of effective adherence to gradualism. The regulatory scheme for 
utilities has changed very little over the last century,61 and some suggest that the 
scheme is ill-equipped to deal with a rapid increase in distributed generation sys-
tems like rooftop solar.62 In 2014, the Governor of New York asked the public state 
                                                                
 52. Robert Walton, Iowa Utilities Mull New Solar Fees, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 24, 2016), 
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 53. Karen Uhlenhuth, Iowa Utilities Propose to ‘Pilot’ a Rate Hike for Solar Customers, MIDWEST 
ENERGY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), http://midwestenergynews.com/2016/03/30/iowa-utilities-propose-to-pilot-
a-rate-hike-for-solar-customers/ (see public comments in docket expressing concern). 
 54. Walton, supra note 52.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Mitchell Schmidt, There Goes the Sun? New Net Metering Rules Receive Mixed Reviews, THE 
GAZETTE (July 24, 2016), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/business/there-goes-the-sun-new-net-
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 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Mark Chediak & Ken Wells, Why the U.S. Power Grid’s Days Are Numbered, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 22, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-22/why-the-u-dot-s-dot-power-
grids-days-are-numbered (“Regulators set rates; utilities get guaranteed returns; investors get sure-thing 
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 62. See id. (“[S]ome utilities will get trapped in an economic death spiral as distributed genera-
tion eats into their regulated revenue stream and forces them to raise rates, thereby driving more custom-
ers off the grid.”); PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A 
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commission to begin fundamental shifts in utility regulation to prepare for more 
distributed generation sources.63 In July 2015, Staff for the New York Department 
of Public Service (“Staff”) published a white paper detailing its proposed new regu-
latory model.64 Without delving too deeply into the details of the new model, it is 
worth noting how the proposal expressly incorporated gradualism into its design.65 
Because Staff’s proposed regulatory changes were so fundamental, Staff 
wanted to ensure that they would not prevent the state from maintaining a “sound 
electric industry,” and secure grid.66 Staff discussed the need to protect consumers 
from rate shocks during the transition.67 Importantly, Staff acknowledged that the 
principle of gradualism should not just apply to rate design: 
The principle of gradualism should apply not only for customers but also for 
whole industries, such as solar and energy efficiency providers, that have re-
sponded to state policies and developed businesses in the state. Any changes af-
fecting these industries should provide ample time for businesses to adapt and plan 
for new forms of opportunity.68 
As Staff recognized, this broad perspective requiring special consideration of 
“any changes affecting [renewable energy] industries,” provides a valuable lens 
when reviewing proposed policy changes.69 This article argues that more policy-
makers should similarly consider such broader impacts when crafting incentive pol-
icies within the environmental sustainability realm.70   
iii. The Principle of Respecting Investment-Backed Expectations 
Incentive policies are also more efficient, and equitable when changes to such 
policies respect citizens’ investment-backed expectations. Stemming from the Fifth 
Amendment,71 the principle of respecting investment-backed expectations first ap-
peared in the United States Supreme Court takings analysis in Pennsylvania Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City.72 When a governmental action compromises a 
                                                                
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 11–12 (Edison Electric Institute 2013), http://www.ourenergypol-
icy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/disruptivechallenges-1.pdf. 
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 64. See generally N.Y. STAFF WHITE PAPER, supra note 33. 
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 66.    . Id. at 8. 
 67. Id. at 11 (“Rate design reform should be carefully phased, taking into account two types of 
timing concerns: the time needed to assess potential bill impacts and foster customer acceptance; and the 
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 68. Id. at 89.  
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citizen’s ability to earn a reasonable return on an investment made in reasonable 
reliance on an existing government policy, then a court is slightly more likely to find 
a compensable regulatory taking.73 For example, in Penn Central, the primary ex-
pectation was the continued use of the Grand Central Terminal as it had been for 
the sixty-five years prior to the case.74 Because the law being challenged in Penn 
Central did not materially disrupt that expectation, the Court ultimately found no 
regulatory taking.75 
The concept of protecting citizens’ and businesses’ investment-backed expec-
tations also relates to what some academics call “deregulatory takings.”76 Deregu-
latory takings occur when there is a deregulation of previously regulated property 
that causes a taking.77 Professors J. Gregory and Daniel F. Spulber assert that these 
types of takings can arise in electricity rate cases, during the phasing-out of incen-
tive programs, and should give rise to breach of contract or takings claims.78 They 
explain, “[a]s regulators dismantle entry barriers and other regulatory restrictions, 
they must honor their past commitments and avoid actions that threaten to confis-
cate or destroy the property of [] investors . . . .”79 
One example of a potential deregulatory taking is the recent attempts to elim-
inate net metering policies. Net metering is a billing and credit system that allows 
retail electricity customers with solar panels to sell any excess electricity that their 
panels generate to their utility at retail electricity prices.80 Net metering programs 
greatly enhance the financial appeal of purchasing or leasing a rooftop solar array.81 
Major reductions to these programs diminishes the value of the solar systems, far 
below the customers’ investment-backed expectations. Customers reasonably as-
sume the incentive programs and the primary benefits they provided would remain 
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 73. See id. at 121. 
 74. Id. at 115–16. 
 75. Thomas Ruppert, Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations: Should Notice of Rising Seas 
Lead to Falling Expectations for Coastal Property Purchasers?, 26 J. LAND USE 239, 247 (2011). 
 76. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1435, 1435–40 (2000). 
 77. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Con-
tract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 855 (1996). 
 78. Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 297, 299 (1998) (reviewing J. 
Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
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 79. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 77. 
 80. EDISON ELEC. INST., SOLAR ENERGY AND NET METERING (2016), http://www.eei.org/issuesand-
policy/generation/NetMetering/Documents/Straight%20Talk%20About%20Net%20Metering.pdf.  
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available for the life of the system.82 Similar unjust impacts occur when a govern-
ment abruptly discontinues a renewable energy-related tax credit after consumers 
have made major investments based on its continued availability.83 
Amortization periods are one potential means of better respecting invest-
ment-backed expectations in connection with policy changes. Historically, amorti-
zation periods were primarily tools to protect landowners’ investment-backed ex-
pectations in the context of rezoning and other major changes to land use ordi-
nances.84 In those settings, amortization periods ensure that a property owner does 
not bear a greater cost under new governmental restrictions than others without 
the same property interest.85 Amortization periods are intended to allow a property 
owner to recoup real estate development investments made in reliance on land use 
laws applicable prior to a substantial change.86 To that end, amortization periods 
permit the property owner to continue to use the property in a manner that does 
not conform to the new government restrictions for a particular time period.  The 
length of years that an amortization period’s non-conforming land use is permitted 
to continue is determined on the amount of the owner’s investment, the fair market 
value of the affected property, or potential replacement costs.87 Depending on the 
jurisdictions, amortization periods are either for a fixed duration, or are determined 
on a case-by-case basis.88 
Grandfathering provisions are an even simpler means of honoring investment-
backed expectations in connection with a change in law. Like amortization periods, 
laws allowing for the grandfathering of certain policies are common in the context 
of land use law and rezoning.89 Grandfathering provisions also appear in contracts, 
in legislation such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,90 the Clean Air 
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 86. Collins, supra note 84, at 217. 
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Act,91 and in connection with various other changes in public programs.92 Grandfa-
thering principles originate from the rule of first possession in property,93 and are 
optimal when applied only “to those who previously had access to the resource and 
substantially in proportion to the extent to, or rate at, which they previously en-
joyed depleting it.”94 Grandfathering provisions take the approach of exempting 
parties from legal and policy reforms, and thereby preserving their property’s value 
rather than compensating them for their losses.95 
Respecting investment-backed expectations is not only a consumer issue; it is 
of significant concern for utility companies. Utility rates are regulated by the gov-
ernment, and are traditionally justified by the concept that the generation and dis-
tribution of electricity is a natural monopoly.96 Consumers are better served by hav-
ing only one utility servicing an area, and having governmental limitations on that 
utility to guard against monopolistic pricing.97 Thus, the government grants the util-
ity a protected monopoly over a particular area, and in return the utility promises 
to supply energy to all persons in the area at a price that would cover all operating 
costs, plus a reasonable rate of return on the amount invested. This implicit agree-
ment under state utility laws is often referred to as the utility [regulatory] com-
pact.98 Thus, utilities also have an investment-backed expectation in the reasonable 
rate of return on investments made for infrastructure and operational costs. 
Stranded costs are a major concern for utilities.99 Stranded costs are seemingly pru-
dent investments that become unsuccessful due to changes in technology, regula-
tory policy, or demand,100  and have been generally permitted to be recovered 
through the utility’s rates.101 Typically, PUCs that set the rates have judicial discre-
tion to allow for full recovery of such investments.102 
Increases in the total generating capacity of renewable energy generating sys-
tems, such as rooftop solar, within a utility’s exclusive territory cut into the utility’s 
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expected rate of return by reducing the aggregate quantity of grid-supplied power 
demanded.103 Electricity rate increases aimed at correcting such effects encourage 
even more of the utility’s customers to invest in distributed renewable energy facil-
ities. This effect is known as the utility death spiral,104 and is a real, growing concern 
for utilities as they try to respond to the growth of distributed energy generation 
within their territories. Ironically, this death spiral argument persists only because 
of a presumption among utilities that they are entitled to rates and policies that 
honor their reasonable investment-backed expectations. 
iv. The Principle of Providing Notice before Significantly Changing Incentive 
Policies 
The final regulatory principle that this article addresses is that of providing 
adequate notice before materially changing the benefits available under sustaina-
bility incentive programs. A practice of providing adequate notice ensures greater 
equity and justice for those affected by policy changes because it gives consumers 
time to respond and avoid adverse financial consequences. Providing adequate no-
tice also invites greater public participation in the policymaking process. 
Adequate notice operates as a procedural safeguard against government ac-
tion.105 The significance of notice is most prominent in the context of laws related 
to procedural and substantive due process. The Constitution specifically provides 
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law,”106 and that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.”107 Procedural due process jurisprudence centers 
on the principle of fairness.108 Adequate notice operates as a procedural safeguard 
against government action.109 If a person’s rights will be affected in a substantial 
way, then that person is entitled to be heard regarding that right.110 However, a 
person can only be heard if they know they need to speak.111 Thus, notice is an es-
sential component of due process, and ensures that a person’s opportunity to be 
heard regarding his or her right is meaningful.112 
Courts usually take a formulaic approach when determining whether due pro-
cess has been violated.113 Courts ask whether the person suffered a deprivation of 
liberty or property without due process of law.114 There can be no violation of due 
process without a liberty or property interest being deprived.115 For the purposes 
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of due process, a sufficient property interest that requires such protection must be 
a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”116 A liberty interest is broader and focuses on 
whether the individual is being constrained not only physically but also socially.117 
The courts will then determine whether there was sufficient notice as procedural 
due process “grants a right to notice and a hearing whenever government action 
threatens a loss” to either of these interests.118 
Notice captures what people view as fair.119 When the government makes a 
sudden policy change without adequate notice, the public tends to react nega-
tively.120 Individuals and the public respond in such a manner because there is a 
psychological significance to notice and information sharing.121 A deprivation of a 
property interest without notice will influence a person’s decision to engage in a 
particular market. That person will remember his or her experiences when evaluat-
ing the costs and benefits of engaging in a similar market. 
In the energy law context, each state has statutes governing notice require-
ments within the PUC’s ratemaking process.122 Utility commissions must provide 
adequate notice so that consumers have time to respond to proposed changes. 
However, even with adequate notice from government officials, many consumers 
rely on third-party vendors for updates. For example, a person who purchases a 
rooftop solar system is unlikely to have a thorough or up-to-date understanding of 
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the incentive programs.123 Instead, the consumer relies on the company selling the 
solar panels to be knowledgeable about the current state of the subsidies. The dan-
ger in relying on a third-party vendor is that the vendor may oversell an incentive 
to induce a purchase.124 This was the case for the Afortish family in Louisiana.125 
Fortunately, there are remedies in contract case law, like the lawsuit the Afortish 
family filed against the third-party vendor.126 In drafting or revising notice provi-
sions for these incentives, state legislatures will not only need to establish guide-
lines on providing consumers adequate notice, but will also need to consider how 
to limit the incentives third parties may have for abusing the notice system. 
II. ANALYSIS 
The remaining sections of this Article examine some specific, well-intentioned 
incentive programs that ultimately encountered difficulties or controversy when 
lawmakers overlooked one or more of the principles outlined above. Section A dis-
cusses the recent Nevada net metering debate in which Nevada’s PUC made drastic 
cuts to incentives for solar customers but was later compelled to reverse that deci-
sion. Section B discusses overly generous tax credits in Oklahoma and Louisiana that 
wreaked havoc on the states’ respective budgets. Section C discusses three other 
sustainable energy-related incentive programs suffering from similar problems. 
A. Net Metering in Nevada 
Nevada’s 2015 net metering dispute is one of the most widely publicized con-
troversies in the solar energy policy arena.127 The dispute highlights failures to ad-
here to each of the principles outlined in Part I above. Nevada, like many states, had 
a net metering incentive program for rooftop solar.128 In 2015, as rooftop solar in-
stallations started booming in Nevada, the state’s PUC made national headlines by 
swiftly eliminating the net metering program and applying the changes retroac-
tively to roughly 32,000 existing owners of rooftop solar.129 Overnight, solar instal-
lation companies shut down and moved out of Nevada and the state’s rooftop solar 
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industry came crashing down.130 Months later, the commission reconsidered its de-
cision and upheld most of its earlier decision, but amended its new fee structure so 
that it was implemented more gradually.131 Nevada’s initial decision is now the go-
to example of “what not to do” when state utility commissions hear proposals to 
modify net metering policies.132 The following materials explain where the commis-
sion went wrong and what other states can do to avoid similar pitfalls. 
i. The Basics of Net Metering Programs 
At the end of 2016, forty-one states had net metering programs of some 
kind.133 Recently, a few states eliminated net metering policies, and more than 
twenty states are considering eliminating or modifying their current net metering 
policies.134 Net metering programs allow rooftop solar owners to sell their excess 
electricity to their utility.135 If a retail customer with rooftop solar panels uses less 
power than what the solar panels produce, then the excess electricity is transferred 
onto the grid and the owner is paid in the form of a credit, most commonly at the 
customer’s retail electricity rate.136 When the customer is using more power than 
the panels are producing, these credits offset the final electric bill.137 
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In Nevada’s case, the legislature enacted its first net metering program in 
1997.138 The legislature placed a cap on the program, making the incentive available 
to only one hundred solar customers.139 However, over the years that followed, the 
legislature made five changes to the statute and implemented various caps on its 
net metering program.140 The final change to the net metering statute occurred in 
2015, when the legislature moved from a percentage-based metric to a mega-watt 
(MW) metric.141 Once distributed, renewable energy systems within the state pro-
duced 235 MW of electricity in aggregate, utilities were no longer required to con-
tinue purchasing electricity at retail rates from new rooftop solar owners.142 The 
legislature based the cap on projections that suggested the cap would be met some-
time in 2016, long enough for the public utilities commission to resolve any disputes 
over the net metering program.143 
Nevada’s 2015 cap change was short-lived. The solar market in Nevada started 
booming in 2014, and by August of 2015, rooftop solar systems produced more than 
the 235 MW cap.144 Initially, the PUC refused to increase the cap through the end 
of the year to cover those customers who purchased solar panels within that 
time.145 However, the commission later reversed its decision and allowed net me-
tering for any systems sold for the remainder of the year.146 Once the cap was 
reached, the utility NV Energy filed with the PUC to modify the current regime.147 
Solar advocates and utilities argued vigorously over the rate at which utilities should 
pay for excess distributed generation power.148 On December 23, 2015, the PUC 
significantly reduced the net metering credit from the retail rate of $0.11 per kWh 
to the wholesale rate of about $0.026 per kWh, roughly a quarter of the retail 
rate.149 The PUC also approved a roughly $40 fixed fee for solar customers.150 These 
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changes wiped out any cost-savings benefit for owning a solar system, and new ap-
plications for rooftop solar installations in Nevada evaporated overnight.151 
ii. Absence of Gradualism in the PUC Process 
Nevada’s PUC arguably violated the principle of gradualism in at least two 
ways with its 2015 changes to net metering in Nevada. First, the PUC drastically 
reduced the compensation rate for net metering, and secondly, it raised the fixed 
fee for solar customers four-fold over the span of only four years.152 Before the PUC 
decision, net metering customers received a credit at the retail rate of $.11 per 
kWh.153 After the PUC decision, the net metering compensation rate immediately 
fell to $.09 per kWh, and within four years it was scheduled to be at only $.026 per 
kWh.154 The final price was roughly a quarter of the original rate. Not only would 
net metering customers see major declines in the cost-savings of their systems; the 
decrease would occur over a relatively short period of four years. The average life 
span of a solar system is anywhere between twenty to thirty years, and most of the 
net metering customers affected were still in the first few years of ownership or 
leases.155 
The Nevada PUC added to its drastic cuts to net metering by simultaneously 
increasing a fixed monthly fee for solar customers from $12.75 to $38.51 within five 
years.156 Not only would customers see less cost-savings from net metering, but 
now they would be penalized for owning the systems by an exorbitant monthly fee. 
To be sure, the PUC purported to follow the principle of gradualism in its final order. 
The PUC stated that it was “in the public interest . . . to gradually move the revised 
rate structure in order to prevent rate shock and allow current and future NEM 
ratepayers ample time and opportunity to adjust their current usage patterns.”157 
Further, the PUC cited other gradually declining subsidies and suggested that the 
rate revisions provided a similar glide path to self-sustainability.158 
Despite the PUC’s flirtation with gradualism in its final order, the resulting pol-
icy can only be viewed as a radical change over a short period of time. In addition 
to the terms of the policy, the aftermath of the decision confirms that the policy did 
not adhere to the principle of gradualism. In the month before the PUC’s order, 
1,311 applications were filed to install rooftop solar systems.159 In the month after 
the order, SolarCity, SunRun, and Vivint pulled operations out of Nevada, and the 
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number of applications dropped to ninety.160 This represented a 93% reduction in a 
single month.161 
iii. The PUC’s Order Did Not Respect Investment-Backed Expectations 
The Nevada PUC’s decision to not grandfather existing solar owners into the 
state’s existing net metering program is arguably the most controversial aspect of 
the order.162 Under that initial version of the PUC’s order, existing customers were 
to be paid at the wholesale rate and charged the fixed fee, just like any new solar 
owner. 163  The PUC’s decision not to grandfather existing customers took many 
stakeholders in Nevada off-guard because not even the utility requested this meas-
ure, and the topic was not discussed during the notice-and-comment period.164 
The PUC’s arguments for not grandfathering existing solar owners centered 
on the difficulties of tracking different generations of solar owners. The PUC Staff 
argued that it was impractical to track different generations of ratepayers, espe-
cially if the account holder moved, added more solar panels, or the solar system 
failed early.165 The PUC also noted that antitrust lawsuits had been filed in other 
jurisdictions for differential treatment of net metering ratepayers.166 Finally, the 
PUC suggested that “most ratepayers understand the fundamental principle that 
utility rates are all subject to change over time,” and therefore should have antici-
pated that the net metering rates were subject to cancellation.167 
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Fortunately, when NV Energy filed with the PUC and sought to modify the net 
metering program in 2015, all parties, including the utility, agreed that existing cus-
tomers should be grandfathered.168 However, it took almost a year of intense polit-
ical pressure,169 a lawsuit,170 a failed ballot measure,171 and a special task force,172 
all together, before the PUC ultimately reversed its decision and agreed to grandfa-
ther existing customers into the old net metering program.173 
iv. The PUC’s Failure to Provide Adequate Notice 
When solar advocates sued the PUC, one of the strongest arguments against 
the order was the PUC’s failure to provide adequate notice to existing customers 
that their rates might be affected by the order. The court agreed, and in Vote Solar 
v. Public Utilities Commission of Nevada, the court noted that neither the utility fil-
ings, nor the notices published by the PUC, contained sufficient notice that existing 
net metering customers would be subject to changes by the PUC.174 Accordingly, 
the court held that the notices “[did not] accurately reflect [the] subject matter” 
that would be addressed, and the notices were “not specific enough to alert all in-
terested persons.”175 Thus, the rate design changes that affected existing net me-
tering customers violated the consumers’ rights to due process, and the court set 
aside the PUC order for existing net metering customers.176 
v. How Can Other Commissions Prevent Similar Situations? 
Failures to fully follow the three regulatory principles highlighted above—
gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and notice—are readily 
visible in the Nevada PUC’s initial 2015 decision. Many of the state’s woes could 
have been avoided with more thoughtfully-crafted enabling statutes. In 2015, 
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shortly before Nevada exceeded its net metering cap, the legislature gave the PUC 
broad discretion to change the net metering program, including authority to apply 
any new net metering policies to existing customers.177 The legislature also failed to 
provide sufficient guidance on what factors the PUC should consider when modify-
ing the net metering policy.178 
The legislature should have included a provision requiring the PUC to consider 
the effects of any policy change for all interested parties and to avoid major changes 
in rates. Additionally, the legislature should have included language prohibiting the 
PUC from changing net metering compensation rates for existing customers. The 
statutes governing the notice requirement were sufficient. The problem was not 
ambiguity in the notice provisions, but rather a failure to adhere to the provisions. 
One lesson learned from Nevada’s net metering dispute is that ideally the enabling 
statutes for renewable energy incentives would emphasize these principles and 
better ensure that PUC’s follow them.179 
B. Runaway Tax Credits 
Renewable energy tax credits, if not designed around the principles discussed 
above, can wreak havoc on a state’s budget. Renewable energy tax credits help sus-
tainable energy investors reduce their tax liability as a reward for investing in spe-
cific types of renewable energy technologies.180 The purpose of the tax credits is to 
reward investment in expensive sustainable energy generation.181 Renewable en-
ergy tax credits ultimately seek to influence consumer behavior towards investing 
in wind, solar, and other renewable energy strategies.182 Tax credits can be an ef-
fective tool for this purpose. However, these tax credits must be designed to limit 
the impact on governmental budgets and must have a carefully-crafted cap in place 
prior to its implementation. As noted below, two renewable energy tax credits in 
Louisiana and Oklahoma are prime examples of a runaway tax credit. 
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i. Louisiana and Solar Energy 
Just a few years ago, Louisiana offered some of the most competitive and gen-
erous tax credits for rooftop solar systems.183 Implemented in 2008, Louisiana’s so-
lar tax credit program covered up to $12,500 for new solar energy installations, 
which can be as much as half the cost of these systems.184 In 2009, state lawmakers 
wanted to make solar more affordable for the poor,185 so they expanded the tax 
credit to also cover leased solar panel systems.186 The lawmakers believed that 
leased systems were one way for the less affluent to access solar energy.187 To en-
courage solar leasing companies to develop business in the state, the legislature 
expanded the cap so that the leasing companies could also access the same tax 
credit.188 
The Louisiana legislature admirably sought to generate investment in the solar 
industry, but severely underestimated demand for its tax credits and failed to im-
pose a cap on the benefit until it was too late. Originally, Louisiana state analysts 
estimated that the state would need to fund approximately $500,000 per year 
worth of tax credits.189 However, like a runaway train, the legislature soon lost con-
trol of the incentive program as the number of claims grew with each passing year. 
In 2008, Louisiana residents claimed almost $1.5 million in credits.190 The next year, 
residents claimed $8.3 million.191 Each year the claims climbed higher. In 2014, res-
idents and businesses claimed $61.1 million in tax credits.192 In the first five years 
of the program, Louisiana spent approximately $147–151 million in tax credits, in-
stead of the estimated $2.5 million.193 
Budget constraints ultimately pressured the legislature to reign in the pro-
gram far before its scheduled expiration date. 194  In 2015, facing a $1.6 billion 
budget deficit, the Louisiana legislature reduced the maximum available credit by 
approximately 20% and capped future solar tax credits at $25 million.195 The legis-
lature implemented a phase-out program in which $10 million would be distributed 
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in 2015 and 2016, and another $5 million would be distributed in 2017.196 Normally, 
a phase-out program is a good solution to avoid harming investors.197 However, 
Louisiana’s attempted phaseout program did more harm than good because the 
caps were set below already-existing claims for the tax credits. In the end, many 
investors did not receive the tax credit they were promised.198 
a. Failure to End the Incentive Program Gradually 
When faced with a budget crisis, lawmakers tend to treat the principle of grad-
ualism as a low priority. So, when Louisiana faced a $1.6billion budget shortfall, 
many of the state’s subsidy programs faced the chopping block.199 Louisiana’s tax 
incentives led to a much larger state payout than originally expected,200 and the 
program certainly needed to be reined in. However, after receiving applications for 
over $60 million in 2014, the legislature set the next year’s cap at only $10 million, 
far below the value of systems already purchased by the time the cap was imple-
mented.201 
The cap forced many Louisiana families into financial crisis because they had 
relied upon receiving the tax incentives in order to help fund the solar panels but 
ultimately did not receive them.202 Without question, some families had so de-
pended upon these tax credits that they would not have bought solar panels had 
they known lawmakers would change the rules midstream.203 Louisiana lawmakers 
had the right idea with the phase-out program, but it should have been imple-
mented when the tax credit was first created. 
b. Failure to Respect Investment-Backed Expectations 
Louisiana’s solar tax credit cap also highlights how abruptly imposing more 
stringent caps on tax credits can violate the principle of respecting investment-
backed expectations. Prior to the caps, many Louisiana consumers took out a short 
18-month bridge loan to cover the costs of installation until they could get the solar 
tax credit.204 Because the legislature failed to place a cap on the program until 2015, 
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both the consumers and third-party leasing companies reasonably relied on receiv-
ing the tax credits.205 When the legislature placed the cap below the level of pur-
chases, it knowingly allocated less money than what would certainly be requested 
from consumers.206 Consumers operated under an existing subsidy regime at the 
time of their purchase, but were not grandfathered in when the legislature imple-
mented the cap.207 
c. Failure to Providing Adequate Notice 
Not only were the caps on the tax credit imposed with little to no adequate 
notice to Louisiana solar owners, but the “first-come, first-serve[]” system removed 
any predictability for consumers.208 Because the credits were distributed based on 
the application date, and not the date of purchase, the credits turned into a race to 
file tax returns.209 Thus, a person who purchased a system in January, when funds 
were still available, might lose their tax credit to someone who purchased a system 
in November—long after available funding had run out.210 This is hardly an equita-
ble way to distribute the credits. 
Perhaps the most egregious consequence of this system was the way third-
party vendors took advantage of the situation. Because a person purchasing a sys-
tem late in the year had an equal chance of receiving a tax credit, leasing companies 
did not stop selling systems once the cap was reached in estimated sales.211 Nor did 
the companies stop suggesting that customers could receive the tax credit.212 The 
first-come, first-serve system created a perverse incentive for leasing companies to 
sell as many systems as possible, knowing they risked nothing by selling systems 
late in the year. Thus, many Louisiana residents who purchased solar systems did 
not get the tax credit that they were promised.213 
d. Retrospective Solutions to Louisiana’s Woes 
States must understand the importance of placing a carefully-crafted cap on 
incentive programs before implementing the program. A proper cap acts as a gentle 
restraint and prevents the incentive from growing disproportionate to the allocated 
budget. In Louisiana’s case, the cap should have been around $500,000 for 2008. 
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Then, when the legislature received applications for $1.5 million in credits,214 law-
makers would have realized they underestimated demand. At that point, the legis-
lature could have either increased the cap for following years, or reduced the gen-
erosity of the credits to lower demand. 
In conjunction with a specific cap, the tax credits should have been distributed 
based on the date purchased rather than the tax credit application date. The best 
system to manage this process would have been a rolling application system. As 
part of the purchase and installation process, owners should have been required to 
report the cost and purchase date of the system to the Louisiana Department of 
Revenue. The Department of Revenue could then keep a running total online to 
notify potential purchasers and vendors how many tax credits remained for the 
year. Thus, if the cap was reached in July, anyone purchasing a system in August 
would know that the tax credit was unavailable. Any customer purchasing a system 
after the cap was met would be on notice that the funds were unavailable and could 
wait until the new year to purchase a system. 
Unfortunately, this system was not envisioned or implemented when the leg-
islature launched the program. However, the legislature’s worst mistake came 
when it failed to grandfather all 2015 customers who had purchased systems before 
the cap was implemented. Data suggests that at the time the ten-million-dollar cap 
was created in July 2015, twenty-three million dollars’ worth of tax credits had al-
ready been invested in solar systems.215 The legislature should have placed the 
2015 cap at least at $23 million to cover every consumer who had relied on the 
availability of the tax credits at the time they purchased the system. Even better 
than a fixed dollar amount, the language for the cap could have read: the cap for 
tax credits in 2015 shall be all funds necessary to cover purchases of distributed 
generation systems up until the effective date of September 1, 2015. The delayed 
date of implementation would have helped the state avoid notice complaints by 
providing consumers a months’ notice to adjust accordingly. 
However, this alternative approach is not without its own problems. A fixed 
end date would likely create a rush to sell solar systems by the specified date. Third 
party vendors would likely engage in high-pressured sales pitches to capitalize on 
the deadline. A fixed deadline might also exacerbate budgetary pressures because 
the amount of purchased solar panels might be more than what the legislature an-
ticipated. However, these concerns would only apply to the 2015 year. Caps for the 
2016 and 2017 year could be set at a fixed dollar amount without violating notice 
or investment-backed expectations, so long as the credits were distributed by date 
of purchase. 
Despite the poor response to the budget crisis, it appears the Louisiana Legis-
lature recognized its mistakes. The legislature recently agreed to pay upwards of 
$15 million in tax credits to consumers who can verify they purchased solar systems 
before the end of 2015.216 
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ii. Oklahoma and Wind Energy 
Oklahoma’s recent experience with renewable energy tax credits provides yet 
another example of the importance of gradualism, respecting investment-backed 
expectations, and adequate notice in adjusting renewable energy incentive pro-
grams. Wind power provides more electricity to the United States than any other 
renewable energy source except hydropower.217 In 2014, wind power produced al-
most 182,000 gigawatt hours of electricity totaling to 4.4%of the United States’ to-
tal electricity generation.218 
Oklahoma is no stranger to wind. Oklahoma has the eighth-best wind re-
sources in the country, and the potential of generating nearly 10% of the United 
States’ electricity needs.219 Additionally, as of 2012, Oklahoma ranked eighth in the 
United States with installed wind energy capacity.220 
Oklahoma encouraged wind energy development within its borders by imple-
menting three wind tax credits and a sales tax exemption.221 The three tax credits 
include: a ten-year zero emission tax credit of 0.50 cents per kilowatt hour gener-
ated, which can be refunded in cash for 85%of its value and ends in 2020; a five-
year ad valorem tax exemption for wind energy infrastructure that ends in 2017; 
and a fifteen-year investment tax credit of up to 2% of the cost of qualified property 
that ends in 2017.222 Additionally, Oklahoma wind facilities qualify for a manufac-
turer’s sales tax exemption.223 
The wind energy tax credits create a significant problem for the Oklahoma 
state government for the same reasons that plagued Louisiana. The legislature 
failed to place a cap on the credits.224 From 2008–2011, applications for the zero 
emissions tax credit averaged $2.5 million per year.225 In 2012, Oklahoma gave out 
$18.1 million in the zero emissions tax credit; in 2013, it gave out $27.2 million in 
the tax credits; and in 2014, it gave out $58.7 million in the tax credit.226 Much like 
Louisiana, Oklahoma lawmakers severely underestimated the demand for these 
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credits.227 Originally, Oklahoma projected the cost to be less than $2 million.228 
Thus, the zero emissions tax credit’s costs continued to increase and impact Okla-
homa’s budget with no end in sight. 
By 2015, Oklahoma faced a budget gap of $1.3 billion,229 and the cost of Okla-
homa’s wind incentives and tax credits were estimated to increase to $700 million 
over a ten-year period.230 Faced with these projections, lobbyists called for reduced 
wind tax credits in an effort to allocate more money in the school budget.231 How-
ever, others argue that a sudden, dramatic decrease in the tax credits will signifi-
cantly affect Oklahoma’s domestic investments.232 Regardless, it is evident that Ok-
lahoma’s wind energy tax credits need to have a cap that balances the budget while 
also respecting the three regulatory principles identified above. In April of 2017, 
Oklahoma ended its zero-emissions tax credit more than three years before its sun-
set date.233 Although Oklahoma will allow previously qualified wind projects to con-
tinue to enjoy the incentive for up to ten years,234 this bill ignores or minimizes the 
principles of gradualism and respecting investment-backed expectations.235 
a. Oklahoma Should Have Implemented a Phase-Out Program Rather than Move 
Up Its Sunset 
Oklahoma faced a quandary: its budget suffered from a runaway wind tax 
credit; however, if it capped the wind tax credits too severely, or altogether as it 
had done, then it would violate gradualism, respecting investment-backed expec-
tations, and sufficient notice. A more gradual phase out was likely the best solution 
to Oklahoma’s budgetary crisis. Whenever possible, a subsidy should be phased out 
with a sunset provision.236 Recent changes to the federal renewable electricity pro-
duction tax credit (PTC) provide a good example of how a subsidy winds down. 
The Federal PTC was first created in 1992, with a sunset provision that ended 
the subsidy at the end of 1999.237 Congress let the credits expire, but renewed them 
a few months later.238 The subsidy expired twice more between 1999 and 2004, and 
both times congress renewed the subsidy a short time later.239 Sunset provisions 
                                                                
 227. Editorial, Oklahoma Wind Power Tax Credits Merit Careful Review, NEWS OK (Mar. 13, 2016), 
http://newsok.com/article/5484384. n. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Ellis & Monies, supra note 225. 
 230. Joe Wertz, Oklahoma Senate Unanimously Approves Bills Limiting Wind Industry Tax Incen-
tives, STATE IMPACT (Mar. 11, 2015), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2015/03/11/oklahoma-senate-
unanimously-approves-bill-limiting-wind-industry-tax-incentives/. 
 231. Ellis & Monies, supra note 225. 
 232. Id.  
 233. Paul Monies, Oklahoma Governor Signs Bills to End Wind Incentive, Airfield Loophole, NEWS 
OK (Apr. 18, 2017), http://newsok.com/article/5545841.  
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Hisham Zerriffi, Rural Electrification: Strategies for Distributed Generation 195 (Springer Sci-
ence + Buisness Media, 2010). 
 237. U.S. Energy Info. Admin, Wind Energy Tax Credit Set to Expire at the End of 2012 (Nov. 21, 
2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=8870. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.  
 
2018 STRUCTURING BETTER CAPS FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
205 
 
have a hard cutoff date, which can promote rapid development right before the 
credit is set to expire.240 This leads to the boom and bust cycles that plague the 
renewable energy industry.241 So, when Congress extended the PTC at the end of 
2015, it introduced a phase-out program to avoid the boom and bust cycle.242 
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 extends the wind PTC another 
three years and gradually reduces the wind tax credits available.243 For projects 
built after January 1, 2017, the tax credit is reduced by 20%; for projects that begin 
construction in 2018, the tax credit amount is reduced by 40%; and for those that 
begin construction in 2019, the tax credit amount is reduced by 60%.244 Any projects 
starting in 2020 receive no tax credit.245 This federal phase-out provision provides 
an excellent example for states to follow and avoids the boom and bust cycles cre-
ated by standard sunset provisions. 
Phase-out programs implement incremental thresholds, which slowly wean 
renewable technologies off the subsidies. Thus, phase-out programs permit a 
slower change in a short-term period as opposed to a quick change that will impose 
an immediate panic and rush to the tax credits. Additionally, phase-out programs 
provide adequate notice to sustainable energy purchasers. Investors can expect 
that delays in starting a wind project will result in a predictable loss of tax credits. 
Coupled with the adequate notice provisions, sustainable energy purchasers will be 
able to know where they stand, given the tax credit. Phase-out programs can also 
respect investment-backed expectations by awarding the tax credits by the date of 
purchase and not on a first-come, first-served basis as previously discussed. 
Admittedly, in Oklahoma’s case, phase-out programs may not have been 
enough. This is because Oklahoma had already offered the wind tax credits without 
providing a glide path to the sunset date.246 Wind energy purchasers had already 
relied on the availability of these credits.247 Because these wind energy purchasers 
have not received the benefits owed to them, Oklahoma arguably needed to find a 
way to honor its commitments and give these purchasers the tax credits. For those 
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who had not yet made investments, Oklahoma could have provided adequate no-
tice to third party vendors and future wind energy buyers of a gradual and reason-
able phase out of the program. Such an approach would have enabled Oklahoma to 
comply with regulatory principles and preserve equity and efficiency in its program. 
C. Other Examples of Incentive Programs 
The three examples of renewable energy policies highlighted above all in-
volved large incentive programs with deficiencies that affected thousands of con-
sumers and impacted state budgets on the scale of hundreds of millions of dollars. 
However, there are many smaller subsidies and incentive programs that also suffer 
a failure to fully adhere to the regulatory principles highlighted in this article. This 
section provides a brief overview of some of these programs to highlight some ad-
ditional ways that ignorance of these principles adversely impacts sustainability pol-
icy. 
i. Arizona HOV Lanes 
Although not a large program, Arizona’s “Energy Efficient Plate Program” pro-
vides another clear example of the importance of providing adequate prior notice 
before substantially changing a sustainability incentive policy. State-level policies 
have the potential to greatly impact the volume of hybrid and electric vehicle pur-
chases.248 Many states promote the sale of hybrid and electric vehicles through tra-
ditional tax credits.249 Some states offer other creative incentives, such as access to 
high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes.250 In theory, HOV lanes are meant to be a “ded-
icated lane for carpoolers to bypass commuting congestion.”251 HOV lanes were de-
veloped to reduce pollution, so it made sense to allow low-emission vehicles to join 
the HOV lane, even if they only carried one occupant.252 Under current federal law, 
states may choose to give any low emission vehicle free or discounted access to 
HOV lanes through 2025. 253  Each state approaches these programs differently. 
Some states issue decals and license plates, while others require no form of identi-
fication.254 
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Arizona’s program issues participants who own a qualifying vehicle a special 
“Clean Air Blue Skies” license plate.255 The state’s program launched in 2007 as a 
pilot initiative and was only available for three vehicle models.256 Arizona only is-
sued 10,000 license plates, which ran out by 2008.257 The program then closed for 
three years until 2011, when approximately 2,500 license plates became availa-
ble.258 The state issued those plates in less than fifteen days.259 In 2014, the Arizona 
Department of Transportation (ADOT) announced that another 1,800 plates had 
become available, and within a year those plates were claimed.260 When the allo-
cated number of plates is gone, the program almost instantly ceases with very little 
prior notice to potential car buyers. 
It is unclear why the demand slowed for HOV plates in Arizona in 2014. By all 
accounts, demand should have increased. Many more vehicle models were eligible 
by 2014, and ADOT had a tracking system in place to notify consumers exactly how 
many plates were left.261 ADOT continues to update the list of eligible vehicles, but 
no more plates have become available since 2014.262 ADOT also removed some 
models, like the original Prius, from the list as more efficient vehicles emerged.263 
However, all existing cars with HOV plates were grandfathered into the program.264 
Arizona’s license plate program is a well-intended attempt to encourage the 
purchase of low-emissions vehicles, but unfortunately the program has some draw-
backs. Among other problems, opportunities to access the program are unpredict-
able. The sporadic nature of the plates’ availability dilutes the incentive mechanism. 
A car buyer in 2017 would not have access to the plates, nor would they know when 
a plate might become available. Even worse, at least some potential buyers who 
thought they would qualify for the state’s special license surely discovered at the 
last minute, or perhaps too late, that there were no more available. The program 
could have better served its purpose if it had simply set a date several months into 
the future at which the plates would no longer be available and made a significant 
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effort to inform citizens of this deadline. Instead, the program has arguably been 
hindered with an unnecessary amount of uncertainty and citizen frustration. 
ii. Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards 
Some states’ abrupt modifications of renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) 
have also potentially created inefficiency and violated citizens’ investment-backed 
expectations. An RPS requires utilities to produce a certain percentage of electricity 
from renewable energy sources, and the structure is inherently gradual. 265 The 
state sets a percentage requirement for a future date, such as 30% by 2030, and 
then sets incremental requirements leading to the final percentage.266 Twenty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia have an RPS.267 Several studies show that an RPS 
can successfully promote renewable technology adoption without imposing signifi-
cant costs on utilities and consumers.268 However, several states have recently at-
tempted to cut or eliminate their RPSs in non-gradual ways.269 
In 2008, the Ohio legislature enacted an RPS that required utilities to generate 
or purchase at least 12.5%of their electricity from renewable sources such as wind, 
solar, and hydroelectric power.270 However, in 2014, Ohio abruptly froze its RPS 
mandate, becoming the first state to do so.271 Soon thereafter, West Virginia re-
pealed its RPS and Kansas converted its mandatory RPS into a voluntary structure 
that diminished incentives to purchase energy from renewables.272 
These swift and sudden revisions to RPSs are another example of how a sus-
tainability-related policy can unjustifiably ignore investment-backed expectations, 
creating controversy and inefficiency. Not all utilities upgrade their infrastructure 
at an equal pace to meet RPS.273 Instead, one utility might already be ahead of 
schedule toward meeting the RPS or have the capability to increase renewable gen-
erating capacity at a lower cost than other utilities. Most states allow utilities to 
trade Renewable Energy Credits which allows the proactive utility to sell its extra 
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capacity to another utility that falls short of the RPS.274 This system is relatively ef-
fective so long as the RPS requirement remains in place. However, if a utility senses 
that the RPS will likely be repealed, it might delay upgrading its infrastructure and 
rely on another utility’s extra credits to comply. In addition, when an RPS is abruptly 
repealed, utilities that have delayed investments in renewable are essentially re-
warded for doing so. 
Fortunately, most states are strengthening their RPSs,275 and in that environ-
ment, early utility investments in renewables may actually pay off. However, legis-
latures should carefully consider the utilities’ investment-backed expectations 
when considering loosening or repealing an RPS. 
iii. Wyoming’s Wind Tax and “Reverse RPS” 
Wyoming’s wind tax and reverse RPS program may also violate the principle 
of respecting investment-backed expectations. Wyoming has long relied primarily 
on coal-fired power plants and locally-mined coal to produce its electricity.276 In 
2016, an interim joint revenue committee that surely recognized wind energy’s ad-
verse impact on the state’s declining coal industry made a proposal that almost cer-
tainly would have violated the principle of gradualism.277 The committee proposed 
tripling the state’s tax on wind energy production, increasing it from $1 per kWh to 
$3 per kWh.278 Faced with a budget deficit of $200 million, the committee reasoned 
that the new tax could produce as much as $40 million in revenue.279 Wind energy 
advocates naturally expressed concern that such a drastic increase risked “taxing . 
. . project[s] out of existence.”280 Fortunately, after five hours of testimony from 
wind companies, and no testimony from supporters of the bill, the revenue com-
mittee rejected the plan by a wide margin.281 
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Undeterred, however, the state legislature proposed a new bill in 2017 that 
would require all utilities serving Wyoming customers to obtain 100% of their elec-
tricity from a list of “eligible sources” by 2019.282 “Eligible sources” were defined as 
coal, hydroelectric, natural gas, nuclear, net-metered projects, and oil.283 Solar and 
wind sources were conspicuously absent from the list. Under the proposed rule, a 
utility could be fined $10 for every MW of electricity it purchased from renewa-
bles.284 The structure of the bill is the exact opposite of an RPS and has been called 
a “reverse RPS.”285 The bill failed to gain sufficient support to move out of commit-
tee, but it is worth considering how the bill fails to respect investment-backed ex-
pectations because other coal-dependent states may attempt a similar measure. 
Wyoming’s reverse RPS would have significantly affected existing utility-scale 
renewable projects because it contained no grandfathering clause.286 Wyoming has 
abundant wind resources, and will soon be home to the largest onshore wind pro-
ject in the United States.287 The project will be able to produce enough electricity 
to power almost a million homes, nearly double the population of the state.288 Ad-
mittedly, most of the electricity from this project will flow to California.289 However, 
that does not justify the swift implementation of policies that would severely un-
dermine initial investments in this and other Wyoming wind farm projects. Such 
legislative action would chill future investment, breed inefficiency, and would be 
very difficult to justify as a matter of public policy. Fortunately, recent attempts to 
prematurely eliminate incentives for wind energy have failed to garner enough sup-
port. Both lawmakers and investors still have adequate time to design a responsible 
phase-out for wind energy incentives that enables the industry to continue a 
healthy pace of growth for years to come. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Lawmakers must achieve a difficult balance when structuring sustainability-
related incentive programs. These programs must advance the policy goals that 
drive them and yet ensure that proper caps and sunset provisions are in place to 
prevent them from exceeding budgets or disregarding the reasonable expectations 
of individuals and businesses. Several recent examples of troubled incentive pro-
grams serve as a stark reminder that the wind-down strategies for these programs 
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can be just as important as the programs themselves. Stricter adherence to the 
principles of gradualism, respecting investment-backed expectations, and providing 
adequate notice can help lawmakers to better keep this important balance. 
Although some sustainability-related industries are already beginning to ma-
ture, more incentive programs will surely be needed to help unleash the next gen-
eration of sustainability technologies. Promising new sustainability innovations fre-
quently appear on the horizon.290 By adhering to the principles described in this ar-
ticle, policymakers can enable these new, exciting technologies to grow in healthy 
and optimal ways. 
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